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Who Knows What When? - 
The Information Content of Pre-IPO Market Prices 
 
Abstract  
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during 
the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs that starts as soon as the 
offer range is published. We examine these pre-IPO prices and find that they are highly informa-
tive. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the 
midpoint of the offer range and the offer price. The pre-IPO prices explain a large part of the un-
derpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries 
are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests. They cast doubt on the in-
formational role of bookbuilding and the relevance of the winner's curse problem.  
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1  Introduction 
The underpricing of initial public offerings has been the subject of intensive theoretical and em-
pirical research and yet still represents a puzzle. At the heart of the puzzle is the question of who 
knows what, and when. Do informed investors know more about the firm value than the issuer 
and the underwriter (as is assumed by, e.g., Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989)? Does the 
underwriter know more than the issuer (as in the principal agent models of Baron and Holm-
ström, 1980; Baron, 1982)? Does the issuer / underwriter have superior knowledge about the firm 
value but voluntarily chooses to underprice for signaling reasons (as in the models of Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989) or to reduce litigation risk (as in 
Hughes and Thakor, 1992)? Is underpricing a means of creating excess demand, which can be 
desirable even if information is symmetric (as in the optimal ownership structure models of 
Brennan and Franks, 1997; Stoughton and Zechner, 1998)?  
Finding answers to these questions is complicated by the fact that there is usually no price history 
before an IPO. In Germany, by contrast, broker-dealers offer OTC trading for investors who want 
to buy or sell IPO shares during the offer process. Bid and ask quotes from this pre-IPO market 
are publicly available. In the U.S., when-issued trading is common in conjunction with stock 
splits (see Angel et al. 1997), but, as in many other countries, it is illegal for IPOs. Consequently, 
there is little prior research on pre-IPO trading. Aussenegg et al. (2002) use German pre-IPO 
quotes to test for information production à la Benveniste and Spindt. Cornelli et al. (2003) de-
velop a theoretical model to explore the impact of pre-IPO trading on bookbuilding. Dorn (2003) 
studies the behavior of retail investors in the German pre-IPO market. 
We use data from the German pre-IPO market to examine the extent of information asymmetry 
during the bookbuilding process and the informational role of the bookbuilding procedure. Our  
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results can be summarized as follows. Pre-IPO prices are highly informative. They are closer to 
the prices subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the offer range and 
the offer price. Pre-IPO prices also appear to be largely unbiased estimates of the subsequent 
exchange prices. Finally, the difference between pre-IPO prices and the offer price explains a 
large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables like issue size, post-IPO volatil-
ity, and market momentum. The results are not driven by individual "hot" issues, or the hot issue 
market of 1998-2000 in general. 
Each IPO we analyze is sold through bookbuilding. According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
bookbuilding serves to elicit information from informed investors. The main implication of their 
theory is that underwriters partially adjust offer prices to new information in order to compensate 
investors for revealing this information. We use the pre-IPO market prices to test the theory and 
do not find evidence of partial adjustment. This casts doubt on the informational role of book-
building, and, in turn, supports the conclusion that pre-IPO markets can efficiently aggregate 
information. Note that our finding contrasts with Aussenegg et al. (2002) who also examine pre-
IPO prices but do not find evidence in favor of partial adjustment in the German market. The 
difference is due to our use of a more general econometric specification. Like Aussenegg et al., 
we use a censored regression framework to analyze price revisions, and take into account that the 
offer price is not set above the upper end of the offer range in Germany. In addition, we also take 
into account that underwriters might avoid to price issues below the offer range.  
Our work is related to previous research analyzing price formation for newly listed issues. Barry 
and Jennings (1992) and Schultz and Zaman (1994) report that the initial return is almost entirely 
reflected in the opening price on the first trading day. Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) analyze the 
quoting activity before the opening price on the first day of exchange trading is set and find that  
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learning takes place in the pre-opening period. Benveniste et al. (2000) analyze equity carve-
outs. They find that the initial returns of the carved-out subsidiaries are related to the returns of 
the parent companies in the pre-IPO period. Due to the existence of pre-IPO trading in Germany, 
we can extend this line of research. We can analyze prices set during the entire offer process 
rather than only in the pre-trading period on the first day of exchange trading, and our analysis is 
not confined to the special case of carve-outs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Ger-
man market for pre-IPO trading. In section 3 we present our data set and some descriptive statis-
tics. Section 4 analyzes the accuracy of the pre-IPO prices and their relation to initial returns and 
price revisions. In Section 5 we summarize our findings and discuss their implications.  
2  IPOs and pre-IPO markets in Germany 
Up to the mid 1990s the German IPO market was rather inactive. Almost all IPOs were fixed 
price offerings. Since 1995, when it was first used, bookbuilding is the dominant selling proce-
dure.
1 With the inception of the Neuer Markt, the (now defunct) growth segment of the exchange, 
and the hot IPO market of the late 1990s, both the number of IPOs and the level of underpricing 
reached unprecedented levels.  
Two characteristics of the German IPO market are important in the context of our analysis.
2 In 
contrast to US bookbuilding practice, upward revisions of the offer range or offer prices above 
the offer range are very rare in Germany.
3 Downward revisions and offer prices below the offer 
                                                 
1  See Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) for a comparison of different selling procedures.  
2  See Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) fur further institutional details of the German IPO market. 
3  The only case of an upward revision was ISION Internet AG, where the range was increased from [53, 60] to 
[53, 69]; the offer price was set at 69 (prices in DM). Why upward revisions are avoided is a largely unexplored 
phenomenon. Ljungqvist et al. (2003) offer a discussion of possible explanations and consequences. Jenkinson et  
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range, on the other hand, do occur. Second, there is an active OTC market in which shares 
of companies that are in the process of being issued are already traded. This market, referred to as 
pre-IPO trading, is organized by several broker-dealers. These act as market makers and quote 
bid and ask prices. Pre-IPO trading covers most issues that are subsequently listed on the Frank-
furt stock exchange. To avoid conflicts of interest, broker-dealers do not make a market in issues 
for which they act as underwriters.  
Trades in the pre-IPO market are forward trades. All transactions are contingent on the IPO tak-
ing place (“if issued”) and are settled on the first trading day of the stock in the secondary market 
(“when issued”). In case the IPO is cancelled the pre-IPO trades are undone. If the subscription 
period is extended by more than three days, or if the offer range is changed, all orders that have 
not yet been filled are cancelled.  
The timing of pre-IPO trading is closely linked to the bookbuilding process (see Figure 1). Pre-
IPO trading usually starts as soon as the offer range and the schedule for the issue are published.
4 
This often happens one day before the subscription period begins. Consequently, there are many 
cases where there is pre-IPO trading prior to the subscription period (region A in Figure 1). Pre-
IPO trading then continues throughout the subscription period (region B). The length of the sub-
scription period differs across IPOs and lies between three days and two weeks. Pre-IPO trading 
lasts until the day before the first exchange listing. When (as is mostly the case in our sample) 
                                                                                                                                                              
al. (2003) present a formal model relating to the European practice of not pricing IPOs outside the offer range. 
We asked a manager of ISION's underwriter and were told that the avoidance of upward revisions is due to the 
resistance of institutional investors.
  
4  In principle, pre-IPO trading could commence prior to the publication of the offer range. However, this would 
increase the probability that pre-IPO trades have to be unwound because an issue is cancelled or delayed.   
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there is one working day between  the  end  of  the  subscription period and the first day of 
exchange trading, there is pre-IPO trading after the end of the subscription period (region C).  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Pre-IPO trading has been organized since the early 1980s. In the late 1990s it has developed into 
a transparent market that is easy to access. Bid and ask quotes from the pre-IPO market are avail-
able through information vendors (REUTERS, Bloomberg) and the internet. Daily newspapers 
(e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Börsenzeitung) often report pre-IPO prices when reporting 
about ongoing IPOs; Börsenzeitung also publishes summary information on the previous day's 
trading (daily high and low prices, trading volume and 4 p.m. bid and ask quotes).  
Both retail and institutional investors can trade in the pre-IPO market. Banks usually do not offer 
retail investors the possibility to take short positions. This is not a peculiarity of the pre-IPO mar-
ket as it also holds for short positions in listed shares. Since trading in the pre-IPO market can 
only occur if some investors take short positions, the restriction implies that institutional inves-
tors play an active role in the market.
5 Börsenzeitung (July 31, 2001) reported that the main sell-
ers were pre-IPO shareholders wishing to reduce their share in the company and institutional 
investors who were confident of receiving share allocations and wished to lock in their profits.  
                                                 
5  Cornelli et al. (2003, p. 2) claim that the depth of the pre-IPO market is "usually not sufficient to interest large 
institutions". While this seems plausible when comparing the absolute trading volume in the pre-IPO market with 
the size of large mutual funds, one should not overlook that, first, there was a large number of small, specialized 
funds in period under analysis, and, second, IPO allocations to mutual funds are often small. Löffler (2003) ana-
lyzes fund transactions in newly issued shares and found many of them to be rather small. One of his sample 
funds (ADIG AS Aktiv Dynamik, a fund with assets under management of € 77 million by June 2000) traded in 
160 new issues in a period of less than 20 months. The median trade size was 0.09% of the issue volume.   
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3  Data 
We restrict the analysis to stocks that went public on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. We obtained 
data on these IPOs (offer price, IPO volume, bookbuilding spread, first trading price, market 
segment) from the exchange. Data on secondary market prices and trading volumes are from 
Datastream.  
Pre-IPO bid and ask quotes are from the broker Börsenmakler Schnigge AG, the broker with the 
largest share in the pre-IPO market.
6 Using quotation, rather than transaction, data is not an im-
pediment to our analysis because our interest is in the information that can be inferred from the 
pre-IPO market. None of our analyses assumes that trades have actually taken place at these 
prices. The quotation data is from two sources. First, Schnigge maintains a historical data base 
that contains the closing bid and ask quotes from the last day of pre-IPO trading (i.e., the day 
before the stock is first traded on the exchange). The date base starts in 03/30/98; our analysis 
ends in 06/30/01. Out of the 400 IPOs that were sold during this period, Schnigge made a pre-
IPO market in 357 issues.
7 We refer to this sample of 357 firms as the full sample. 306 of these 
companies chose to list on the growth segment Neuer Markt. 
Second, Börsenzeitung started publishing daily (4.00 p.m.) Schnigge quotes in April 2000. From 
June 2000 onwards, Börsenzeitung also published daily volume data. We collected these data 
                                                 
6  Schnigge claims to have a market share of 80% (annual report 1999, p.14). 
7   Schnigge does not make a market if involved in the underwriting. It also appears that Schnigge refrained from 
making a market in issues with little investor interest. Consistent with this interpretation, issues not covered by 
Schnigge are smaller (the median issue volume is € 30.82 million vs. € 39.10 million for the full sample), less 
underpriced (22.25% vs. 42.71%), and very rarely listed on the growth segment Neuer Markt (1.8% vs. 85.7%).  
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from 04/17/00 through 06/30/2001. We refer to this sample as the daily sample. It covers 112 
IPOs, for 86 of which we also have volume data. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample, the full sample broken down by years, 
and the daily sample. The average issue size is € 117.6 million, the median is € 39.9 million. The 
underpricing in the sample period, measured by the return from the offer price to the first price 
established on the exchange, is substantial. The mean underpricing is 42.7%, the median is 
13.3%. Only 10.1% of the issues are overpriced. The hot IPO market from 1998 through 2000 is 
evidenced by the large number of IPOs and the high underpricing in these years and is consistent 
with findings for the US (see, e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). In 2001, both the number of 
IPOs and the average underpricing decreased significantly. The underpricing in the daily sample, 
19.15%, is not significantly different from the 1960-95 average of 15.80% for German IPOs re-
ported by Stehle and Ehrhardt (1999). Since we obtain similar results for the full and the daily 
sample, we are confident that our results are not driven by the 1998-2000 hot issue market. 
For the IPOs for which we have information on daily pre-IPO market trading volume (86 IPOs 
from June 2000 onwards), the mean daily volume as a percentage of shares issued in the IPO is 
0.48% (median 0.31%). For the same 86 stocks, we compute the mean secondary market volume 
– again as a percentage of shares issued – on the 30
th day of exchange listing, which is 0.55%. 
The pre-IPO trading volume is thus of the same order of magnitude as the trading volume in the 
secondary market. 
Figure 2 presents an example. It shows the evolution of the pre-IPO quotes for Linos AG, a com-
pany that went public on the Neuer Markt on September 1, 2000. The offer price range was €24 
to € 27. The subscription period lasted from August 24 to August 30. Pre-IPO trading began on  
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August 23 (the day on which the offer range was announced) and lasted until August 31 (the 
day before the first listing on the exchange). The first pre-IPO bid prices were more than 30% 
above the upper end of the offer range. In the course of the offer process, the quotes rose steadily. 
The quotes on the last day of pre-IPO trading were above € 50. The daily average trading volume 
was 9,450 shares. This is equivalent to 0.68% of the issue volume. The offer price was set at the 
upper end of the offer range (€ 27). The first market price on September 1 was € 73. In this par-
ticular case, the pre-IPO quotes were thus considerably lower than the first market price, but they 
were also consistently closer to it than both the midpoint of the offer range and the offer price. In 
addition, the difference between the pre-IPO quotes and the subsequent first market price de-
creased in the course of the pre-IPO trading period. This is evidence of price discovery and in-
formation aggregation through pre-IPO trading. The next section will reveal whether this picture 
is representative. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
4  Empirical Results 
We present our empirical results in two subsections. The first contains a univariate analysis of the 
accuracy of the prices set in the pre-IPO market. The second subsection presents the results of a 
multivariate analysis aimed at shedding light on the information content of pre-IPO quotes and 
the informational role of the bookbuilding procedure.  
4.1 Pricing  Accuracy 
A first indication of the accuracy of the pre-IPO prices is the frequency with which the first mar-
ket price on the exchange falls within the last pre-IPO quotes. We find this to be the case for 
52.9% of the IPOs in our sample. In contrast, only 26.9% of the first exchange prices are inside  
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the offer range, even though offer ranges are wider than the bid-ask spreads in the pre-IPO 
market (see Table 1).  
To assess the accuracy of the pre-IPO quotes in more detail we examine the percentage differ-
ence between the prices set during pre-IPO trading and the first market price set on the exchange 
after completion of the IPO. We define the pre-IPO pricing error as:
  
 
,
,
Pre-IPO pricingerror
ii j
ij
Pp
p
−
=  (1) 
where Pi is the first exchange price of stock i, and pi,j is a pre-IPO quote midpoint for stock i at 
stage j of the pre-IPO trading period.
8 For the full sample, we only have quotes from the last day 
before the IPO. For the daily sample, we calculate variants of the pre-IPO pricing error based 
upon prices quoted on the day before the subscription period, on the first and last day of the sub-
scription period, halfway through the subscription period, and on the day before trading on the 
exchange starts.
9 In 30 cases, pre-IPO trading commenced only on the first day of the subscrip-
tion period.
10 For the quotes from the day before the subscription period the number of observa-
tions thus reduces from 112 to 82.  
In order to gauge the magnitude of the pre-IPO pricing errors we compare them to two bench-
marks. The first is the “offer range error”  
                                                 
8  Alternatively, we also use logarithmic and market-adjusted pricing errors. The results are similar.  
9  If the subscription period extends over an even number of trading days, we take the midpoint to be the day that is 
closer to the beginning of the subscription period.  
10  These are the cases where there was no working day between the publication of the issue details and the start of 
the subscription period (i.e., the cases where there is no region A, see Figure 1). In 17 out of these 30 instances, 
the subscription period began on a Monday or on a day following a public holiday.   
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Midpointof offerrange
Offer rangeerror
Midpointof offerrange
i P −
=  (2) 
and the second is the “offer price error” which is identical to the underpricing defined above: 
 
offer price
Offer price error
offer price
i P −
=  (3) 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the pricing errors. The results for the full sample are 
shown in Panel A. The mean offer range error is 49.4%, and the mean offer price error is 42.7%. 
The first official price set on the exchange is thus more than 40% higher than both the midpoint 
of the offer range and the offer price. By contrast, the last pre-IPO price is, on average, almost 
equal to the first price on the exchange. The mean pre-IPO pricing error is only 0.6%, which is 
not significantly different from zero (t-value 0.76, z-value for a Wilcoxon test 1.58). The standard 
deviations show that the pre-IPO prices are not only less biased, but also more efficient estimates 
of the first market price than both the midpoint of the offer range and the offer price. The stan-
dard errors of the offer range error and the offer price error are 77.5% and 69.0%, respectively, 
more than four times as large as the corresponding figure for the pre-IPO pricing error (15.7%). 
In the light of this, the gain in accuracy that the offer price achieves relative to the offer range 
midpoint appears to be small. The results are not due to outliers. After winsorization—we replace 
the 5% largest and smallest observations with the 95% and 5% quantile of the distribution, re-
spectively—the standard deviation of the offer price error is 55.40% whereas the corresponding 
value for the pre-IPO pricing error is only 11.23%. Viewed in isolation, the standard deviation of 
the pre-IPO pricing error may appear high, but it is similar to the volatility of post-IPO exchange  
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prices. The cross-sectional standard deviation  of close-to-close returns from the first day of 
trading on the exchange to the second is 13.20%.  
So far, we have described differences in accuracy without testing for their statistical significance. 
We conduct paired t-tests as well as Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests to test the null 
hypothesis of no difference between absolute pre-IPO pricing errors on the one hand, and abso-
lute offer range and offer price errors on the other hand (see Table 3). In each test, the null hy-
pothesis is rejected at the 0.1% level or better. Taken together, the results indicate that, first, pre-
IPO quotes are significantly more informative than the offer range and the offer price and, sec-
ond, that pre-IPO quotes are good proxies for the prices set on the first trading day on the ex-
change.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Moving on to the daily sample, a similar picture emerges. As for the full sample, Table 2 contains 
the descriptive statistics, while Table 3 presents tests for differences in absolute pricing errors. 
The pre-IPO pricing errors are, again, significantly smaller than both the offer range errors and 
the offer price error. Intriguingly, pre-IPO pricing errors calculated from pre-IPO quotes set on 
the day before the start of the subscription period are significantly smaller than the offer range 
errors, and are smaller (though not significantly so) than the offer price errors.
11 The pricing ac-
curacy steadily increases towards the IPO date, indicating that the quality of the information 
                                                 
11  It may seem surprising that quotes from the day before the subscription period are closer to the first market prices 
than pre-IPO prices from subsequent days. Note, however, that the standard deviation of the pricing error is 
higher at the beginning. Further, the number of observations is reduced from 112 to 82 because, in 30 cases, the 
first day of pre-IPO trading coincided with the first day of the subscription period (no region A, see Figure 1). 
Consequently, there are no pre-IPO quotes from the day before the subscription period for these 30 issues. Re-
stricting the analysis to those 82 IPOs where pre-IPO trading commenced on the day before the subscription pe-
riod began shows no significant differences between the days before and during the subscription period.   
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available to market participants rises over time.  Further tests (not reported in Table 3) show 
that the absolute pre-IPO pricing errors from the last day of pre-IPO trading are significantly 
lower than the ones from the first day of the subscription period. This increase in accuracy may 
be due to the arrival of public information, or to the gradual incorporation of private information 
into pre-IPO prices. 
Pre-IPO quotes set during the subscription period are significantly higher than the first market 
price. Thus, investors buying shares in the pre-IPO market and selling them on the first day of 
exchange trading would have lost money on average. In an analysis of individual investor trades, 
Dorn (2003) documents such losses, which he ascribes to over-optimistic sentiment. Although 
one cannot rule out this possibility, there is an alternative explanation related to a sort of peso 
problem. When making their trading decisions, investors may have assigned a positive probabil-
ity to a revival of the hot issue market, which then did not occur. Since the daily sample contains 
several issues with underpricing above 100%, such expectations are not necessarily irrational.  
The analysis of the pre-IPO pricing errors can be complemented by a Mincer-Zarnowitz test for 
unbiasedness. We run the following regression:
12 
  ,, ijj i j i j Pp α βε = ++  (4) 
Here, we interpret the pre-IPO prices  , ij p  as estimates of the "true" price which, in turn, is prox-
ied by the first price set on the exchange,  i P .
13 We estimate similar regressions using the 
midpoint of the offer range and the offer price, respectively, as independent variables. Unbiased-
                                                 
12  To reduce the impact of heteroscedasticity, we exclude one observation (the IPO of Deutsche Börse AG) because 
prices were much larger than those of the other IPOs. Including Deutsche Börse AG in the sample does not 
change any of the results.  
13  See, among others, Rock (1986) for a justification of this assumption.   
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ness implies  0 j α =  and  1 j β = .  Given  the descriptive statistics presented above we 
expect only the pre-IPO quotes to be unbiased estimators of the true price.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
The results are shown in Table 4. The final pre-IPO quotes are unbiased estimators of the true 
price (i.e., the joint null hypothesis  0 j α =  and  1 j β =  is not rejected) whereas the midpoint of 
the offer range and the offer price are not. In the daily sample (Panel B), unbiasedness is rejected, 
however, for pre-IPO quotes established until the midpoint of the subscription period.  
4.2  Pre-IPO Quotes and Underpricing: Multivariate Analysis 
Most underpricing theories argue that underpricing is a rational answer to informational asymme-
tries. They also predict that the magnitude of underpricing varies cross-sectionally. Several em-
pirical papers have uncovered variables that help to explain this variation (see Wasserfallen and 
Wittleder, 1994; and Ljungqvist, 1997 for research on the German IPO market). When comparing 
the pre-IPO pricing errors to the offer price errors (which, as noted above, are identical to our 
measure of underpricing), we should take into account the fact that a portion of the underpricing 
is predictable. Specifically, we wish to analyze whether the pre-IPO quotes contain information 
that is not already contained in those variables that have proven to have explanatory power for 
the magnitude of the underpricing. We use the following variables:
  
•  the natural logarithm of the issue volume. In previous research (e.g. Ljungqvist, 1997) it has 
been documented that underpricing is negatively related to the size of the issue.   
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•  the standard deviation of daily returns in  the 20 trading days after completion of the 
IPO as a proxy for the uncertainty about the true value of the stock.
14  
•  the return of an appropriate stock index in the 60 days prior to the subscription period. We 
include this variable because a strong positive relation between underpricing and the market 
return prior to the issue has been documented for Germany by Ljungqvist (1997). For firms 
that went public on the Neuer Markt we use the NEMAX All Share index, for firms listed on 
other segments of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we use the CDAX index. Both indices are 
broad, value-weighted performance indices published by the exchange. 
•  the index return during the subscription period. We include this variable because the German 
practice of not adjusting the offer range limits the ability of underwriters to adjust the offer 
price to general market movements during the subscription period.  
•  a dummy variable for IPOs placed on the Neuer Markt. As shown by Kukies (2000), firms 
going public on the Neuer Markt are primarily small, young firms, where informational 
asymmetries are likely to be relatively high.
15  
•  a dummy variable marking offerings that were managed or co-managed by a US investment 
bank (or a European affiliate thereof). This is motivated by Ljungqvist et al. (2003) who 
document lower underpricing for international IPOs led by a US bank. 
•  the price revision, which we define as the percentage difference between the offer price and 
the offer range midpoint. If underwriters partially adjust to new information as predicted by 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), initial returns are positively related to price revisions.
16 
                                                 
14  Using the percentage offer range as an alternative measure of the uncertainty leaves the conclusions unchanged.  
15  In the full sample [daily sample] 85.7% [83.0%] of the IPOs went public on the Neuer Markt.   
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The results for the full sample are shown in  columns (1a, 1b) of Table 5. The coefficient of 
the issue volume has the expected negative sign but is insignificant. The coefficient on the sec-
ondary market volatility is positive and significant at the 1% level. The underpricing is strongly 
positively related to the index returns prior to, and during, the subscription period. Issues sold on 
the Neuer Markt exhibit higher underpricing, while choosing a US underwriter does not affect 
initial returns. Finally, initial returns are positively related to price revisions. Together, the inde-
pendent variables explain 34% of the variation in underpricing. The standard error of the regres-
sion is 56.2%, which is still more than three times as large as the standard deviation of the pre-
IPO pricing errors (15.74%, see Panel A of Table 2). This indicates that the pre-IPO prices con-
tain information beyond that contained in the variables included in the underpricing regressions. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
This conclusion is strongly confirmed when we add the pre-IPO return as an additional explana-
tory variable. For the full sample it is defined as
17  
  1
price offer 
quotes   IPO - pre last    of Midpoint 
−  (5) 
If, for whatever reasons, underwriters do not fully adapt offer prices to the market's assessment of 
the firm value (as represented by the pre-IPO quotes), the pre-IPO return should have explanatory 
power for the observed underpricing. Consistent with this argument, inclusion of the pre-IPO 
return changes the regression results dramatically. The R
2 jumps from 0.34 to 0.82. Except for 
the secondary market volatility, the other independent variables lose significance. The coefficient 
                                                                                                                                                              
16 To capture potential asymmetries, we also included an additional variable defined as price revision times a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the price revision is positive. Conclusions do not change.  
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of the pre-IPO return is close to one, the value  one would expect if pre-IPO quotes were unbi-
ased. Including only the pre-IPO return on the right-hand side yields an R
2 of 0.81 (not reported).  
The results presented so far may be driven by the fact that in Germany offer prices are de facto 
bounded above by the upper end of the offer range. To check the robustness of our results, we 
excluded all IPOs where the offer price was equal to the upper end of the range. Coefficient esti-
mates for the resulting sub-sample (116 observations) are shown in columns (2a, 2b) of Table 5. 
When only the "traditional" variables are included, the regression has no explanatory power, as 
evidenced by a negative adjusted R
2. Including the pre-IPO return increases the R
2 to 0.61. The 
pre-IPO return alone explains 60.7% of the cross-sectional variation in underpricing. Thus, the 
results are not solely driven by hot IPOs priced at the upper end of the offer range.  
The results for the daily sample, which represents a much “colder” IPO market, are summarized 
in columns (3a) and (3b). They are consistent with those for the full sample, showing that the 
informativeness of the pre-IPO return is not limited to the hot IPO period.  
So far, the regressions explored the information content of the last available pre-IPO quotes. 
These are quoted after the offer price is set. To identify the information that was available before 
the pricing decision, column (3c) uses the daily sample to analyze whether the pre-IPO return 
from the offer range midpoint to the pre-IPO midquotes from the first day of the subscription 
period helps to explain the amount of underpricing. The answer is a definite yes. Again, the R
2 
increases substantially upon inclusion of the pre-IPO return, from 0.15 to 0.44. The documented 
information content of pre-IPO quotes can thus not be attributed solely to information that was 
disseminated in the course of the pricing process.  
                                                                                                                                                              
17  This pre-IPO return is only observed after the offer price is set; using the daily sample, we will also examine the 
informativeness of quotes that are set before the offer price (see below).  
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The  results  indicate  that  pre-IPO  quotes  contain information related to the value of the 
IPO firm. The information content of pre-IPO quotes by far exceeds the information that is in-
ferred from (publicly observable) control variables. Put differently, valuation uncertainty during 
the offer process is much lower than the variation in underpricing suggests. This does not neces-
sarily imply that the bookbuilding procedure fulfils no informational role. The information acqui-
sition theory states that the underwriter adjusts offer prices only partially to new information be-
cause they need to cede informational rents to informed investors. The theory is traditionally ap-
plied to information revealed during bookbuilding. In an IPO market such as Germany, where 
price rigidity limits the informational role of bookbuilding, information production could concen-
trate on the pre-subscription period (Ausseneggg et al. 2002; Jenkinson and Jones, 2004; Jenkin-
son et al. 2003). This conjecture is consistent with the observations made so far: underwriters do 
not adjust offer prices to fully reflect the information contained in pre-IPO quotes because this 
information has been revealed to them before, with the implicit understanding that offer prices 
are only partially adjusted. Otherwise, investors would not have any incentive to reveal their in-
formation.  
The partial adjustment hypothesis can be tested using censored regression analysis. Specifically, 
we test whether prices would fully adjust if they were not constrained by the offer range. As 
above, we define the price revision ∆p as (offer price / midpoint of offer range – 1) and regress it 
on the independent variables included in the underpricing regressions from above. The crucial 
coefficient is the one on the pre-IPO return, for the calculation of which we use the pre-IPO 
quotes from the last day of the subscription period. It is thus defined as (midpoint of pre-IPO 
quotes from last day of the subscription period / midpoint of offer range – 1). This specification  
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ensures that underwriters could observe the  pre-IPO returns before setting the offer price. It 
also implies that the analysis can only be conducted for the daily sample. The regression model is  
 
1
pre-IPO-return
n
ii
i
px αβ γ
=
∆= + + ∑  (6) 
where the xi denote the set of independent variables introduced earlier. We test whether the coef-
ficient γ is significantly different from one. If it is not, we cannot reject the hypothesis that un-
derwriters fully adjust to available information. We use a generalized tobit specification which 
assumes that the price revision can be both right and left censored, and that censoring values are 
observation-specific.
18 Observations are treated as uncensored if the offer price lies within the 
offer range, or outside of it. An observation is right-censored if the offer price is equal to the up-
per end of the offer range.
19 Left-censoring occurs if the offer price is equal to the lower end of 
the offer range. To determine censoring, we use the final offer range, after any adjustments that 
occurred during the subscription period; to compute price revisions and pre-IPO returns, we use 
the initial offer range. 
One may wonder why setting the offer price at the lower end of the range is an instance of cen-
soring when downward adjustments are not ruled out. There are several possible reasons for 
avoiding downward adjustments: costs of negotiating and communicating the adjustment; reputa-
tional costs
20 (if the market views adjustments as evidence of unsuccessful offers); protection 
against collusion among institutional investors. The data confirms the conjecture that the lower 
                                                 
18  Estimation is done using the INTREG command in STATA. 
19  Note that a offer price equal to the upper end of the offer range is the most frequent case in our sample (see 
Table 6 for details). Therefore, the number of right-censored observations is quite high, amounting to 50% of the 
total number of observations. This should be taken into account when interpreting the results.   
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end of the offer range constitutes a threshold  that may be crossed, but usually is not. As 
shown in Table 6, prices cluster at the lower end of the range. In the daily sample, prices are 
more often set at the lower end of the offer range than within the range. The picture does not 
change if one removes the five cases in which the offer range was adjusted.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 7 presents the regression results. The estimated coefficient γ is 0.94. It is not statistically 
different from one (p = 0.61). We thus cannot reject the hypothesis that underwriters would fully 
adjust offer prices to pre-IPO-quotes if they were unconstrained. To check robustness, we allow 
the coefficient γ to vary with the sign of the pre-IPO return, or drop the other independent vari-
ables (specifications (2) and (3)). The conclusion does not change. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Aussenegg et al. (2002, Table 7) conduct a similar analysis for Neuer Markt IPOs of the years 
1999-2000 and obtain an opposite result. In their regression, the coefficient γ is 0.771, signifi-
cantly different from one. However, they do not model left-censoring. If we use our data and es-
timate γ in the way Aussenegg et al. do, we obtain an estimate of 0.743, significantly different 
from one (p-value=0.0001). The differences between our study and theirs thus appear to be due to 
the econometric modeling of the pricing behavior. We favor our approach because the clustering 
at the lower end of the offer range strongly points to censoring, and because our modeling of cen-
soring is more general. It does not require that the lower end influences the underwriter’s choice 
of the offer price; it just allows for cases in which it does. The analysis of Aussenegg et al., on 
                                                                                                                                                              
20  Nanda and Yun (1997) analyze the relation between underpricing and the market value of the investment bank. 
They find that overpriced issues are associated with a decrease in the market value of the lead underwriter.   
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the other hand, assumes that the lower end of  the offer range never restricts the underwriter’s 
choice.  
5  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we exploit a special feature of the German equity market, namely the existence of an 
active pre-IPO market to examine IPO underpricing in Germany. We demonstrate that pre-IPO 
prices are highly informative. They are, on average, very close to the prices subsequently estab-
lished on the exchange, much closer than both the midpoint of the offer range and the offer price. 
In addition, the pre-IPO return (defined as the “return” between the midpoint of the offer range 
and the midpoint of the IPO quotes on the day prior to the first trading day on the exchange) ex-
plains a large part of the underpricing that is left unexplained by market momentum and other 
variables. 
These results imply that information asymmetries are likely to be much lower than the observed 
variance of underpricing suggests. Any informational disadvantage of uninformed investors, for 
instance, is largely reduced because they can monitor the pre-IPO prices and condition their sub-
scription decision on that information. They can thereby alleviate the winner’s curse problem. In 
the presence of a pre-IPO market that efficiently aggregates private information, the winner’s 
curse is therefore unlikely to be a valid explanation for high levels of underpricing.  
In information acquisition models (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), underpricing rewards informed 
investors for revealing their information during the bookbuilding process. Previous empirical 
studies (e.g. Hanley, 1993; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002; and Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001) 
provide support for this hypothesis. However, they do not quantify the extent to which the under-
pricing can be explained through the Benveniste-Spindt argument. We find that pre-IPO prices 
on the day before the subscription period are already as informative as the offer price. This result  
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leaves little role for information production  during the subscription period. Some 
researchers have argued that information production in Europe, and particularly in Germany, 
takes place prior to the subscription period (e.g. Aussenegg et al. 2002; Jenkinson and Jones, 
2004; Jenkinson et al. 2003). In this case, underwriters would not fully incorporate the informa-
tion contained in pre-IPO quotes because they have to cede rents to investors who revealed this 
very information before bookbuilding started. Within a censored regression framework we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that underwriters fully adjust to the information contained in pre-IPO 
quotes. This is, again, inconsistent with information acquisition models.  
In some theories, underpricing serves as means to create excess demand, either to achieve a pre-
ferred ownership structure (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Stoughton and Zechner, 1998) or to serve 
the underwriters’ interests (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Such explanations are not built on infor-
mation asymmetries and are thus consistent with our findings. 
Taken together our results cast a shadow of doubt on the dominant role that is often ascribed to 
information asymmetries in explaining the underpricing of IPOs. In this sense, our paper supports 
the conjecture of Ritter and Welch (2002) that asymmetric information cannot explain the re-
cently observed high levels of underpricing, and that underpricing research should concentrate on 
agency conflicts and allocation issues.   
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  pre-IPO trading  secondary 
market 
Figure 1: Timeline for offer process and pre-issue trading. 
The figure shows the timing of events for a typical IPO. Day 0 is the first day of trading on the exchange. Pre-IPO 
trading starts as soon as the offer range is published. In the majority of cases this happens one day before the sub-
scription period begins. If this is the case, pre-IPO trading thus starts before the subscription period begins (region 
A). The length of the subscription period varies from 3 days to two weeks. The 5-day period shown in the figure 
represents the median value in our sample. The last day of pre-IPO trading is the day before trading on the exchange 
starts. Since in many IPOs there is one day between the end of the subscription period and the first trading day on 
the exchange, there is often pre-IPO trading after the end of the subscription period (region C).  
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Figure 2: An example: Pre-IPO trading of LINOS AG. 
Linos AG went public on September 1, 2000 at an offer price of € 27. The first price established on the exchange 
was € 73. The offer range was € 24 to € 27, the subscription period lasted from August 24 to August 30. Pre-IPO 
trading began on the day of the announcement of the offer range (August 23) and lasted until August 31. The shown 
pre-IPO bid and ask quotes were recorded at full hours from the website of the broker-dealer Schnigge.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the sample  IPOs 
 
    IPO volume (mil-
lion €) 
Underpricing 
(%) 
Width of initial 
offer range (%) 
Width of last pre-IPO 
bid-ask spread (%) 
mean 117.57  42.68  17.63  10.45 
median 39.90  13.33  16.95  10.00 
full sample 
NOB=357 
std. dev.  465.90  69.01  5.31  4.24 
mean 40.65  72.35  15.45  11.19 
median 27.92  38.78  14.43  11.11 
1998  
NOB=39 
std. dev.  41.06  75.12  3.95  3.62 
mean 82.27  38.55  17.24  10.50 
median 37.65  8.88  16.47  10.00 
1999  
NOB=152 
std. dev.  185.80  65.81  4.73  4.36 
mean 170.96  43.14  18.17  10.33 
median 46.20  14.29  17.39  9.52 
2000  
NOB=149 
std. dev.  686.11  71.66  5.78  4.10 
mean 141.73  7.48  21.45  9.33 
median 21.60  1.14  20.69  8.00 
2001  
NOB=17 
std. dev.  303.46  23.56  6.24  5.61 
mean 127.74  19.15  19.32  9.76 
median 34.75  5.00  18.18  9.19 
daily  
sample  
NOB=112 std.  dev.  565.80  36.95  6.39  4.03 
Notes. The table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample, the full sample broken down by years, and the 
daily sample. Underpricing is defined as (first price on the exchange / offer price – 1). The width of the offer range 
is defined as 2 × (upper bound – lower bound) / (upper bound + lower bound). Similarly, the width of the pre-IPO 
bid-ask spread is defined as 2 × (ask – bid) / (ask + bid). NOB denotes number of observations. 
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Table 2: How accurate are pre-IPO quotes? -  An analysis of pricing errors 
Quantiles (percent)   
 
Mean  
(percent) 
t-
value
Std. dev. 
(percent) 
Std. dev. (after 
winsorization, 
percent)  25%   50%  75%  
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=357)            
Offer range error  49.44 12.05 77.52 64.21  0.00 20.69  73.68 
Offer price error  42.71 11.70 69.00 55.40  1.09 13.33  60.26 
Pre-IPO pricing error 
(Last pre-IPO quotes) 
0.64 0.76  15.74  11.23  -6.47  -1.58  4.58 
             
Panel B: Daily Sample (NOB=112)             
Offer range error  19.34  4.46  45.90  39.08  -10.28  10.73  32.8 
Offer price error  19.15  5.48  36.95  30.23  0.00  5.00  22.7 
Pre-IPO pricing error based on 
quotes from the:              
  day before subscription period   -5.13  -1.67 27.83  23.25  -23.50  -8.25  5.2 
  first day of subscription period  -9.48  -4.06 24.72  20.38  -24.42  -12.41  0.3 
  midpoint of subscription period  -7.80  -4.06 20.37  18.46  -20.00  -8.10  1.5 
  Last day of subscription period  -4.26  -2.50 18.07  14.78  -15.18  -5.15  1.1 
  Last day of pre-IPO trading   0.47  0.36  13.66  8.82  -5.80  -2.66  3.61 
Notes. The pre-IPO pricing error is defined as  
,
,
Pre-IPO pricing error
ii j
ij
Pp
p
−
=  
where Pi is the first trading price and pi,j is the midpoint of pre-IPO quotes. The offer range error and the offer price 
error are defined similarly as  
Midpointof offer range
Offer rangeerror
Midpointof offer range
i P −
=  and 
finaloffer price
Offer priceerror
finaloffer price
i P −
= ,  
respectively. Means, standard deviations and the quantiles are reported in percent. The t-values in the third column 
are for a test of the null hypothesis of a zero mean. In the winsorization, extreme observations are pulled to the vari-
able’s 5% and 95% quantiles, respectively. For the quotes from the last day before the subscription period the num-
ber of observations (NOB) reduces to 82 as trading did not commence at this stage in some cases. For this sample of 
82 IPOs, the standard deviation of the offer range error and the offer price error is 48.3% and 39.9%, respectively.  
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Table 3: Testing differences between absolute  pricing errors 
  Offer range error  Offer price error 
 
t-statistic and 
p-value 
z-statistic (Wil-
coxon test) and 
p-value 
t-statistic and 
p-value 
z-statistic (Wil-
coxon test) and 
p-value 
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=357)        
Pre-IPO pricing error 
(Last pre-IPO quotes) 
12.39 (0.000)  14.91 (0.000)  10.44 (0.000)  10.85 (0.000) 
Panel B: Daily Sample (NOB=112)      
Pre-IPO pricing error based on 
quotes from the:       
  day before subscription period   3.57 (0.001)  2.42 (0.016)  1.03 (0.306)  0.51 (0.613) 
  first day of subscription period  3.51 (0.001)  2.09 (0.037)  0.66 (0.512)  0.98 (0.326) 
  midpoint of subscription period  4.78 (0.000)  3.62 (0.000)  1.87 (0.064)  0.09 (0.938) 
  last day of subscription period  5.94 (0.000)  6.18 (0.000)  3.15 (0.002)  1.50 (0.133) 
  last day of pre-IPO trading   8.09 (0.000)  8.69 (0.000)  5.28 (0.000)  5.10 (0.000) 
Notes. Using paired t-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, we test the significance of mean differ-
ences between the absolute pre-IPO pricing errors on the one hand and the absolute offer range errors and absolute 
offer price errors on the other hand. The variables are as defined in the legend to Table 2, except that absolute values 
are taken. Table entries are test statistics for the null hypothesis of zero difference between the absolute pricing er-
rors of the prices defined in the column and row headers, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. For the quotes 
from the day before the subscription period the number of observations (NOB) reduces to 82.  
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Table 4: Are pre-IPO quotes unbiased  estimates of the true price? – Results from 
Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions 
Dependent variable: First market price 
  j α   j β   R
2 
p-value for H0: 
0; 1 jj α β ==  
Panel A: Full Sample (NOB=356)         
midpoint of offer range  -8.679 
(-1.82) 
1.956 
(8.86)  0.669 0.000 
offer price  -8.843 
(-2.28) 
1.878 
(10.52)  0.695 0.000 
last pre-IPO price  -0.756 
(-0.93) 
1.034 
(39.09)  0.964 0.366 
Panel B: Daily Sample (NOB=111)         
midpoint of offer range  -2.376 
(-1.12) 
1.377 
(9.60)  0.654 0.000 
offer price  -2.129 
(-1.41) 
1.355 
(12.28)  0.727 0.000 
Pre-IPO quotes from         
  Day before subscription period   -3.781 
(-2.09) 
1.159 
(11.87)  0.809 0.064 
  First day of subscription period  -1.395 
(-0.87) 
0.992 
(11.70)  0.783 0.009 
  Midpoint of subscription period  -1.715 
(-1.32) 
1.023 
(14.33)  0.853 0.003 
  Last day of subscription period  -0.660 
(-0.66) 
1.001 
(17.23)  0.881 0.160 
  Last day of pre-IPO trading   -1.203 
(-1.38) 
1.080 
(20.80)  0.934 0.289 
Notes. The Table shows the results of the regression 
., ijj i j i j Pp α βε = ++  
where  i P  is the first price set on the exchange and pij is as defined in the first column. t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The last column shows the p-value for a Wald test of 
the joint null hypothesis  0; 1 jj α β == .  
In both panels one observation (the IPO of Deutsche Börse AG) has been excluded. The prices were much larger 
than those of the other IPOs. For the quotes from the last day before the subscription period the number of observa-
tions (NOB) is reduced to 81 as trading in some IPOs did not commence at this early stage.  
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Table 5: Do pre-IPO quotes explain cross- sectional variation in initial returns?  
Dependent variable: Initial return 
 
 
 
Full sample 
Full sample and 
offer price < upper limit 
 
Daily sample 
Independent variable  (1a)  (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a)  (3b)  (3c)
Constant 0.122  0.017  -0.027  -0.042  0.032  -0.036  0.039 
 (0.99)  (0.28)  (-0.52)  (-1.37)  (0.24)  (-0.45)  (0.36) 
log(volume) -0.037  -0.021  0.004  0.005  0.015  0.008  -0.028 
 (-1.34)  (-1.45)  (0.42)  (0.91)  (0.42)  (0.45)  (-1.07) 
secondary market   3.792  0.923  0.890  0.107  2.470  0.145  1.165 
Volatility (4.12)  (2.06)  (1.99)  (0.40)  (1.81)  (0.21)  (0.99) 
index return   0.991  -0.045  -0.054  -0.116  0.184  -0.229  -0.231 
  (prior to subscription period)  (5.65)  (-0.54)  (-0.63)  (-1.64)  (0.56)  (-1.44)  (-0.98) 
index return   2.228  0.445  0.256  0.076  1.133  0.555  1.263 
  (during subscription period)  (4.55)  (1.35)  (1.40)  (0.63)  (1.83)  (1.37)  (2.23) 
Neuer Markt IPO  0.192  0.038  -0.010  -0.017  0.062  -0.012  -0.010 
 (3.49)  (1.32)  (-0.39)  (-0.98)  (0.92)  (-0.37)  (-0.16) 
US underwriter  0.065  0.005  0.018  -0.016  -0.092  -0.049  0.036 
 (0.71)  (0.08)  (0.61)  (-0.86)  (-0.98)  (-0.95)  (0.37) 
Price revision   0.602  0.026  -0.057  -0.062  0.800  0.107  0.254 
 (2.83)  (0.25)  (-0.32)  (-0.62)  (3.51)  (0.64)  (1.15) 
pre-IPO return     0.997    0.972    1.116  
  (last day of subscr. period)    (15.65)    (11.43)    (7.51)  
pre-IPO return              0.712 
  (1st day of subscription  
  period) 
          (4.91) 
Number of observations 357  357 116 116 112  112  112
Adj. R²  0.336  0.820  -0.002  0.606  0.147  0.742  0.444 
Std. error of regression  0.562  0.293  0.113  0.071  0.341  0.188  0.276 
Notes. The Table shows the results of regressing initial returns on variables that, based on previous research, are 
considered to explain the level of underpricing: the natural logarithm of the issue volume, the secondary market 
volatility in the 20 days following the IPO, the return on an appropriate stock index, computed separately for the 60 
days prior to the subscription period and for the subscription period, and dummy variables for firms that went public 
on the growth segment Neuer Markt, and for those underwritten by US banks. We also include the pre-IPO return, 
defined as (midpoint of pre-IPO quotes / offer price – 1) when using the last available quotes or as (midpoint of pre-
IPO quotes / offer range midpoint – 1) when using the quotes from the first day of the subscription period. t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 6: Location of offer prices relative to the  final offer range 
 
< range  at lower end  lower end <  
< range midpoint 
at range  
midpoint 
range midpoint<
< upper end  at upper end  > range 
Panel A: Full sample (NOB=357) 
11 44  32  10  19  241  – 
Panel B: Daily sample (NOB=112) 
8 25  13  4  6  56  – 
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Table 7: Are offer prices fully adjusted to  information contained in pre-IPO quotes?  
Dependent variable: Price revision  
Independent variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
constant  -0.353 -0.349  -0.117 
 (-5.61)  (-5.08)  (-6.98) 
log(volume) 0.044  0.044   
 (4.91)  (4.73)   
secondary market   -0.184  -0.173   
  volatility  (-0.33)  (-0.32)   
index return   0.184  0.176   
  (prior to subscription period)  (1.4)  (1.31)   
index return   -0.009  -0.014   
  (during subscription period)  (-0.04)  (-0.06)   
Neuer Markt IPO  0.139  0.138   
 (3.2)  (3.18)   
US underwriter  -0.003  -0.004   
 (-0.06)  (-0.08)   
pre-IPO return   0.938  0.921  1.120 
  (last day of subscription period)  (7.67)  (5.47)  (8.00) 
pre-IPO return × Ipre-IPO return < 0   0.056   
   (0.17)   
p(coeff. pre-IPO return = 1) 0.612 0.638 0.390 
Number of observations  112  112 112 
Notes. With a censored regression we analyze the determinants of price revisions  (= offer price / midpoint of offer 
range – 1). An observation is right-censored if the offer price is equal to the upper end of the offer range. Left-
censoring occurs if the offer price is equal to the lower end of the offer range. To determine censoring, we use the 
final offer range, after any adjustments that occurred during the subscription period; revisions and pre-IPO returns 
are computed based on the initial range. To test the adjustment of offer prices to information contained in pre-IPO 
quotes, we examine the coefficient of the pre-IPO return, defined as (midpoint of pre-IPO quotes / midpoint of offer 
range  – 1). t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
 